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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this petition for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-86 and § 63-46b-16. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission correctly determined that the Petitioners were not 
dependents of the decedent under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-71. 
Standard of review: The determination of dependency is a question of fact. Rigby v. 
Industrial Commission. 286 P. 628, 630 (Utah 1930). The Court of Appeals reviews the whole 
record to determine whether the Industrial Commission's findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. Virgin v. Board of Review. 803 P.2d 1284 (Utah App. 1990); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission correctly determined that the decedent's estate was 
not entitled to an award of temporary total disability from the date of his injury to the date of his 
death. 
Standard of review: Whether an award of temporary total disability is appropriate in this 
case is a question of law. The Court of Appeals reviews the Industrial Commission's decision 
under a correction of error standard. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
3. Whether the Industrial Commission made adequate findings of fact and conclusions of 
law is a question of law. The Court of Appeals reviews the record with no deference to the 
Commission to determine whether the findings of fact and conclusions of law are legally 
sufficient. Adams v. Board of Review. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(h). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-71 (1994) 
Utah Administrative Code R568-12 (1994) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This proceeding arises from a claim for dependents benefits filed by 
petitioners Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimodo ("the sisters") based upon their brother 
Barney Caporoz' death from an industrial accident. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and 
the Industrial Commission ("Commission") denied the claim. The sisters then sought review by 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Proceedings Below: On May 7,1994, Barney Caporoz was injured in an industrial accident 
while working for Handyman Willie, an uninsured employer. Barney Caporoz ("the decedent") 
passed away on December 17, 1994. The sisters filed a Claim For Dependent's Benefits and/or 
Burial Benefits before the Commission. (R.l) The Uninsured Employers' Fund filed a general 
denial in answer to the claim. (R. 14) The ALJ denied the sisters' claim for dependents benefits 
and an award of temporary total disability to the decedent's estate. (R. 125-130) 
Disposition Below: The sisters filed a motion for review on May 3, 1996 raising the issues of 
partial dependency and temporary total disability and complaining that the ALJ did not draft his 
own order. (R. 132) The Commission issued an order denying the applicant's motion for review 
on October 30, 1996. (R. 168-173) 
RFXEVANT FACTS 
1. The sisters moved to a three bedroom house in Plain City in 1990 when Verna Caporoz' 
employer got a contract with Iomega which is located near Ogden. Prior to their move to Plain 
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City, the sisters shared a house in Salt Lake City. (R. 231) Two years later, the sisters invited 
their brother, the decedent, to come live with them in Utah. The decedent moved from Hawaii to 
Utah in 1992 to live with his sisters. (R. 232) 
2. The decedent and his sisters were each employed. The decedent and Ms. Caporoz earned 
approximately the same income (R. 213, 220-221), while Ms. Clastimodo earned somewhat less 
(R. 256-257). Each of them contributed to their common living expenses. (R. 209, 220-229, 257-
260) The decedent paid $400 per month, which included his share of the rent and other basic 
household expenses. (R. 209) His contribution was placed in his sisters' checking account, along 
with his sisters' earnings. (R. 238-239) Ms. Caporoz then paid rent and other household 
expenses out of the checking account. (R. 225,226-227, 238-239) Monthly household expenses 
included rent and utilities at $400, automobile insurance at $106, payments on Ms. Caporoz' 
charge accounts at $156, cable television at $37 and other household needs. (R.221-222, 224-
229, 232-233) 
3. The sisters and the decedent split the telephone bill according to the long distance calls 
made by each of them. (R. 227, 257-259) The decedent and his sisters each contributed to food 
purchases. (R 208, 232-233, 241, 258) He occasionally provided his sisters with money for 
movies and trips to Wendover, Nevada and day trips to Lagoon Amusement Park. (R. 208, 240-
243) 
4. At the time the decedent joined his sisters, they already owned some furniture, including 
a table and chairs, beds, a loveseat, two living room chairs and a television set. (R 212, 235) 
They also had basic household items such as dishes, utensils and pans. (R. 223) After the 
decedent arrived, he purchased several items of second hand furniture, including a bed for 
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himself and a couch. (R. 233-234) The family also purchased some used living room furniture 
(R. 212, 235) Ms. Caporoz owned two motor vehicles when her brother moved into the house. 
The decedent repaired one of the vehicles and assisted Ms. Caporoz in obtaining a third vehicle. 
(R. 221) 
5. The decedent was injured in a work related accident on May 7, 1994 and passed away on 
December 17, 1994. (R. 26, 127) At the time of his death, the decedent was 33 years old, Verna 
Caporoz was 35 years old and Roxsanne Clastimodo was 30 years old. (R. 1, 246) 
6. Immediately after the decedent's injury, Ms. Caporoz quit her job. Ms. Caporoz did not 
quit her job to provide care for her brother but because she wanted to sit with him while he was 
hospitalized. (R. 235-236) She remained off work for five months during which time the sisters 
fell behind on their financial obligations. (R. 243, 246) The sisters were compelled to sell 
various items of personal property. (R. 215, 218) After Ms. Caporoz returned to work, the 
sisters have met their payment obligations and are repaying their accumulated debt at the rate of 
$250 per month. (R. 237-238, 246) They continue to reside in the Plain City home. (R. 237) 
7. On May 5, 1995, the sisters filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits claiming 
that they were the decedent's dependents. (R. 1) 
8. No claim for workers' compensation benefits was filed on behalf of the decedent during 
his lifetime and no award of temporary total disability benefits was entered in favor of the 
decedent prior to his death. (R. 169) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The determination of dependency is a question of fact. The sisters have failed to marshal 
all of the evidence in the record to show that the Industrial Commission's findings are not 
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supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, their petition for relief should be denied. 
The Court of Appeals reviews the whole record to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits. The evidence in the record 
supports the Commission's conclusion that the sisters were not dependent upon the decedent. 
2. The Commission correctly determined that the decedent's estate was not entitled to an 
award of temporary total disability compensation for the time between his injury and his death. 
Utah law is clear that the Commission may not make a posthumous award of temporary total 
disability unless the award was vested prior to the decedent's death. 
3. The Commission's order clearly shows outlines the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusions on each factual issue were determined. Accordingly, there is no need to remand this 
matter for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. The Industrial Commission Correctly Determined That 
Petitioners Were Not Dependent or Partially Dependent 
Upon the Decedent for Support. 
A. The Petitioners Failed to Marshal the Evidence. 
The sisters claim that the evidence in the record does not support the Commission's 
determination that they were not partially dependent upon the decedent for support. However, 
the sisters have failed to "marshal all the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 ( Utah 
App. 1989). 
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The sisters' brief also completely ignores one finding that was at the heart of the 
Commission's determination. The sisters fail to mention that Ms. Caporoz quit her job after her 
brother was injured and remained off work for the next five months. Ms. Caporoz did not quit 
her job to provide care to the decedent. He was in a hospital under the care of medical providers 
for the entire period between his accident and his death. The fact that Ms. Caporoz quit her job 
deprived the household of her income. This fact was central to the Commission's determination 
that the sisters' financial problems following the accident were due to the loss of Ms. Caporoz' 
income rather than the loss of the decedent's support. 
The petitioner's failure to marshal the evidence as required should result in the court 
accepting the Commission's findings of fact as conclusive. Crapo v. Industrial Commission. 297 
Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 15 (Utah App. 1996); VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission. 901 P.2d 281, 
284 (Utah App.) cert, denied. 910 P.2d 426 (Utah 1995). 
B. The Commission's Finding of No Dependency Is Supported by Substantial Evidence 
In the Record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-71 identifies those who qualify to claim dependents benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act: 
35-1-71. Dependents-Presumption. 
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon 
a deceased employee: 
(1) Children under the age of 18 years, or over if physically or 
mentally incapacitated and dependent upon the parent, with whom they are living 
at the time of the death of such parent, or who is legally bound for their support. 
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under Subsection 35-1-
68(2)(a)(i), a surviving husband or wife shall be presumed to be wholly dependent 
upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the time of the employee's death. 
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be 
determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time 
of the injury or death or such employee, except for purposes of dependency 
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reviews under Subsection 35-l-68(2)(a)(iii). No person shall be considered as a 
dependent unless he or she is a member of the family of the deceased employee, 
or bears the relation of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or 
sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall include a posthumous child, and 
a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half sisters shall be 
included in the words "brother or sister" as above used. 
Although the sisters do not qualify for the presumption of dependency set out above, they may 
qualify as dependents of the deceased based on the specific facts of this case. 
The determination of dependency under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act is a 
question of fact based upon the relationship between the sisters and the decedent on the date of 
the accident. Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission. 534 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1975); Rigbv v. 
Industrial Commission. 286 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah 1930). The sisters have the burden to 
establish their dependency on the decedent by a preponderance of the evidence. Lipman v. 
Industrial Commission. 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979). 
The Commission correctly determined that the sisters were not dependent upon the 
decedent for support and denied their claim for benefits. The Commission applied the Rigby test 
as set out in Farnsworth: 
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo have-the burden of proving dependency which 
is a question of fact that must be made on a case by case basis. They must 
establish that they relied upon the deceased worker for support, that had the 
deceased worker not been killed, the applicants would have continued to receive 
some assistance, and that it was reasonably necessary for the deceased worker to 
render aid to the applicants to allow them to maintain their accustomed standard 
of living. 
Order Denying Motion For Review, Appendix 1. 
The Commission observed that the decedent "carried his share of household expenses" 
but "did not subsidize his sisters' expenses." Although the decedent occasionally treated his 
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sisters to movies, admission to Lagoon and lodging and meals at Wendover, the Commission 
concluded that those items were not significant to the support and maintenance of the sisters. 
The Commission noted that the financial difficulties suffered by the sisters after the decedent's 
injury were due to the fact that Ms. Caporoz unnecessarily quit her job after the injury, not the 
loss of support from the decedent. 
In other words, the Commission found that the sisters did not rely upon the deceased for 
support. The Commission determined that the contributions of the deceased to the household 
expenses were essentially no more than his share. Therefore, the arrangement between the sisters 
and the decedent was that of three independently supporting adults sharing expenses as 
roommates. Although the decedent occasionally treated his sisters to movies and other 
entertainment, those gifts were not necessary to maintain and support his sisters. 
The evidence presented at the hearing showed that Ms. Caporoz quit her job after her 
brother's injury. Although she was not required to care for her brother who remained 
hospitalized until his death, she remained off work for five months. Accordingly, during the 
period immediately following the decedent's industrial accident, the household suffered the loss 
of Ms. Caporoz' earnings. The Commission determined that it was the loss of Ms. Caporoz' 
earnings that caused the financial reverses the sisters ascribe to the loss of the decedent's support. 
There was conflicting evidence regarding the cause of the sisters' decreased standard of 
living, and the Commission resolved that conflict to the detriment of the sisters. The court 
should "not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views . . . It is the 
province of the Board, not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the 
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inferences." Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). 
The sisters claim that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard to determine 
dependency because the Commission order found that the decedent "did not subsidize his 
sisters' expenses." "Subsidize" means "to support or assist with a subsidy,"1 Although the 
Commission used language that is different from that in Rigby , the result is the same. The 
Rigby test contemplates that a dependent received some type of actual financial support from 
the decedent. The use of the term "subsidy" by the Commission does not change the test. The 
Commission simply found that the decedent did not contribute to the support of his sisters. 
The sisters further claim that the Commission applied a higher standard because of the 
statement that "the Industrial Commission does not consider such items [movies and trips to 
Lagoon or Wendover] as significant to the support and maintenance of Ms. Caporoz or Ms. 
Clastimodo." It is clear that the expenses to which the Commission refers are occasional 
entertainment expenses or gifts; not contributions to the sisters' support. "Support" as used in 
the statute refers to the provision of food, shelter, clothing and other items necessary to maintain 
the dependent in his accustomed station in life. Farnsworth at 899. In the case of adult siblings, 
it is not reasonable to find dependency based upon isolated, insubstantial gifts of entertainment. 
The Commission's conclusion that the sisters were not dependents of their deceased 
brother for workers compensation purposes is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
Accordingly, the court should affirm the Industrial Commission's order denying dependency 
benefits. 
1
 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988). 
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Point II. There Was No Award To Mr. Caporoz Prior To His Death, 
So No Benefits Can Pass To His Estate. 
A. The Caporoz Estate Cannot Receive Benefits That Were Not Vested In The Decedent 
Prior To His Death. 
The sisters incorrectly assert that the decedent's estate is entitled to a payment of 
temporary total disability compensation for the period between the decedent's injury and the day 
of his death. It is well settled in Utah that an award for compensation under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act vests when an award is made and ceases upon the applicant's death. Heiselt 
Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission. 197 P. 589, 592 (Utah 1921). In Heiselt. David 
Murphy's fingers were frozen while employed by Heiselt Construction Company. Mr. Murphy 
later died from causes unrelated to his industrial injury. The Industrial Commission awarded 
permanent partial disability benefits to Murphy's estate after Murphy's death. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the award holding that an award of compensation does not vest until the 
award is made during the applicant's lifetime. 
A claim for dependent's benefits is separate and independent from any claim the decedent 
may have had during his lifetime. Hailing v. Industrial Commission 263 P. 78, 81 (Utah 1927). 
In Hailing, the claim pursued by Mariner Hailing during his lifetime was denied by the 
Industrial Commission. Upon his death, Rose Hailing, his wife, timely filed a claim for 
dependent's benefits. The Industrial Commission denied the claim concluding that the denial of 
Mr. Halling's claim precluded the claim of Mrs. Hailing and the children "who claim through 
him." The Utah Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the claim of Halling's dependents was 
"separate and independent of any claim Mr. Hailing may have had in his lifetime." Id. at 81. 
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Accordingly, the denial of Mr. Hailing's claim was not binding on his dependents and did not bar 
their claim for benefits after his death. 
Parker v. Industrial Commission. 50 P.2d 278 (Utah 1935), cited by the sisters is 
distinguishable from Heiselt. The decedent in Parker received an award of benefits from the 
Industrial Commission prior to his death. After Mr. Parker's death, the insurance carrier reftised 
to pay the benefits which had been earlier awarded. The Court held that the award was vested 
and accrued upon his death. Therefore, the award could be paid to Mr. Parker's estate. In 
Heiselt. the benefits in question were not vested and accrued. Therefore, those unaccrued, 
unvested benefits did not pass to the decedent's estate. Id. at 279. The Utah Supreme Court 
reaffirmed Heiselt and Parker in Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial Commission. 218 
P.2d 970, 974 (Utah 1950). 
Based upon the Court's reasoning in Hailing, the instant claim for dependent's benefits 
cannot support a claim for temporary total compensation benefits to the decedent's estate. 
No claim for workers' compensation benefits was filed by Mr. Caporoz or his representative, and 
no award of any kind was ever made to him while he was living. Therefore, under the analyses 
contained in the cases cited above, Mr. Caporoz did not have a vested and accrued award which 
could pass to his estate upon his death. 
B. R568-1-12 Does Not Apply To Determine the Date An Award Vests. 
The petitioners claim that R568-1-12 provides the date upon which the decedent's award 
became accrued and vested. The relevant portions of R568-1-12 provide: 
R568-1-12. Interest. 
A. Interest must be paid on each benefit payment which comprises the award from 
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the date that payment would have been due and payable at the rate of 8% per 
annum. 
B. For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits shall become "due and 
payable" (as used in Section 35-1-78, U.C.A.) As follows: 
1. Temporary total compensation shall be due and payable within 21 days of the 
date of the accident. 
The sisters fail to note that the plain language of R568-1-12(B) specifically limits the 
rule's application to the calculation of interest on workers' compensation awards. The rule 
cannot and does not apply to vest an award of benefits when no claim has ever been filed. 
The Commission correctly denied the sisters' claim for temporary total disability 
benefits because no award of benefits vested and accrued prior to the decedent's death. For the 
reasons outlined above, this court should affirm the Commission's order denying the sisters' 
claim for temporary total disability to be paid into the decedent's estate. 
Point III. The Order of the Industrial Commission Contains Adequate 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The sisters assert that the Order of the ALJ and the Commission are insufficient to permit 
meaningful review and do not reveal the method by which the Commission reached its 
determination. This assertion is without merit. 
"An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are 
adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review." Adams v. Industrial 
Commission. 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991). In order for the court to meaningfully review the 
findings of the Commission, the findings "must be sufficiently detailed to include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Adams at 4, quoting Acton v. Deliram 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
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In this case, the Commission set out a number of factual findings in its order. These facts 
show that the decedent lived with his adult siblings and that they shared rent and other household 
expenses in the manner of roommates, each paying their own way. That occasionally, the 
decedent treated his sisters to movies or other recreational activities. The facts also state that the 
decedent was injured and later died as the result of a work related accident, and that following 
the accident, his sister, Verna Caporoz, unnecessarily quit her job to stay with the decedent at the 
hospital. Subsequent to the accident and Ms. Caporoz quitting her job, the evidence shows that 
the sisters suffered financial setbacks and were forced to sell some of their personal possessions. 
The evidence further showed that once Ms. Caporoz returned to work, she has been able to repay 
the accumulated debts at a rate of $250.00 per month. 
The Commission concluded from these facts that the sisters were not dependent upon the 
decedent for support. The Commission reasoned that the evidence showed that the siblings each 
paid their own way during the course of their daily lives, but that occasionally, the decedent 
would treat his sisters to some form of entertainment. The Commission concluded that the 
occasional entertainment provided by the decedent was not support. The Commission further 
concluded that the financial setbacks the sisters suffered after the accident did not show 
dependency because Ms. Caporoz quit her job on the day her brother got hurt. The Commission 
attributed the sisters' financial setbacks to Ms. Caporoz quitting her job rather than the loss of the 
decedent's contribution to the household. 
With regard to the Commission's denial of temporary total disability, again the 
Commission's reasons are clear. According to relevant case law, the right to compensation for 
injuries is personal to the employee. Unless an award has been made by the Commission during 
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the decedent's life, the decedent's estate has no claim for unpaid compensation on behalf of the 
decedent. Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial Commission. 218 P.2d 970, 974 (1950). 
No application for benefits was filed on behalf of the decedent and no order was entered 
awarding benefits to the decedent prior to his death. Any pending claim for compensation or 
other benefits payable to the decedent expired with his death. Therefore, no temporary total 
disability payments had vested or accrued to the decedent which could be paid to his estate. 
It is the Commission's order that is on review to the Court of Appeals. The respondents 
assert that the Commission's order clearly sets forth the reasons for its decision and comports 
with the requirements of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Accordingly, the 
Commission's order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Review of the whole record in this matter clearly shows that the Commission's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are supported by substantial evidence. The sisters had the burden 
to prove that they were dependent upon the decedent for support and they failed to meet that 
burden. The claim for temporary total compensation to be paid to the decedent's estate fails 
because no award was entered prior to his death. Therefore, Respondents respectfully request 
that this court affirm the Industrial Commission's order denying benefits in this matter. 
DATED this (VP . day of April, 1997. 
r^K^Jk^^Sfy^ jf~'f^j> 
Sharon J. Eblen, Attorney for Respondent 
Uninsured Employers'Tund 
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Order of the Industrial Commission 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
VERNA CAPOROZ and 
ROXSANNE CLASTIMODO, 
Sisters of BARNEY 
CAPOROZ, deceased, 
Applicants, 
v 
GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ, Margaret 
RODRIGUEZ and TIM FRAGA, dba 
HANDY MAN WILLIE, and THE 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, 
Defendants. 
Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimodo ask The Industrial 
Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge fs 
decision denying their claim for dependents' benefits and the claim 
of the estate of Barney Caporoz for temporary total disability 
compensation under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. The 
Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for 
review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
1) Were Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo dependents of Mr. 
Caporoz and therefore entitled to the benefits provided by §35-1-73 
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"). 2) Is Mr. 
Caporoz' estate entitled to temporary total disability compensation 
for the period between his accident and death? 3) Did the ALJ fail 
to properly consider and resolve the factual and legal issues 
presented by applicants' claim? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On May 17, 1994, while working for Handy Man Willie, Mr. 
Caporoz was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment. Mr. Caporoz died from his injuries on December 17, 
* 
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1994. At the time of his accident, Mr. Caporoz resided with his 
sisters Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo. 
Mr. Caporoz was 33 years old at the time of his death. Ms. 
Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo were 35 and 3 0 years old, respectively. 
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo had come to Utah from Hawaii 
approximately six years earlier. They had first lived together in 
Salt Lake City, then moved to Plain City. When Mr. Caporoz came to 
Utah three years later, he too lived in the Plain City home. 
Mr. Caporoz and his sisters were each employed. Mr. Caporoz 
and Ms. Caporoz earned approximately the same income while Ms. 
Clastimodo earned somewhat less. He paid $400 per month as his 
share of rent and other basic household expenses. His contribution 
was placed in his sisters' checking account, as were his sisters' 
earnings. Ms. Caporoz then paid rent and other household expenses 
out of this checking account. Such expenses included rent at $400 
per month, automobile insurance of $106 per month, payments on some 
charge accounts, and other household needs. 
In addition to Mr. Caporoz' monthly payment toward household 
expenses, he purchases food items that were shared with his 
sisters. He also paid for cable television service and his share 
of long distance telephone charges. He occasionally provided his 
sisters with money for movies. On several occasions he paid for 
travel and lodging in Wendover, Nevada and for day trips to Lagoon 
Amusement Park. 
At the time Mr. Caporoz joined his sisters, they already owned 
some furniture, including table and chairs, beds, loveseat, two 
living room chairs and a television set. They also had basic 
household items such as dishes, utensils and pans necessary for 
their home. After Mr. Caporoz arrived, he purchased several items 
of second-hand furniture, including a bed for himself, a couch and 
other living room furniture. The family acquired two used motor 
vehicles in addition to the automobile Ms. Caporoz already owned. 
Immediately after Mr. Caporoz was injured at work, Ms. Caporoz 
quit her job in order to be with her brother an the hospital. She 
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remained off work for five months, during which time she and her 
sister fell behind on their financial obligations. They were 
compelled to sell various items of personal property. Now that Ms. 
Caporoz has returned to work, she and her sister are meeting their 
current obligations and are slowly repaying their accumulated debt. 
They continue to reside in the Plain City home. 
I On May 5, 1995, Ms. Caporoz filed a claim for dependent's 
benefits and burial expense with the Industrial Commission. It 
does not appear that any claim was ever filed on behalf of Mr. 
Caporoz for temporary total disability compensation for the period 
between his injury and death. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
I. DEPENDENTS' BENEFITS: 
When an accident causes the death of a worker, §35-1-68(5)(b) 
of the Act provides survivors' benefits to family members1 who were 
dependent on the deceased worker for their support. In this case, 
the parties agree that Mr. Caporoz' death arose out of and in the 
course of his employment at Handy Man Willies. The only issue in 
dispute is whether Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo were partially 
dependent upon Mr. Caporoz for their support. 
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo bear the burden of proving 
dependency,2 which is a question of fact that must be made on a 
case by case basis. They must establish that they relied upon the 
deceased worker for support, that had the deceased worker not been 
1
 Those family members eligible for survivors' benefits are 
identified in /§35-l-71 of the Act and include sisters and half 
sisters. 
2
 Minor children, disabled children and surviving spouses are 
generally presumed to be dependent, pursuant to §35-1-71 of the 
Act. However, no presumption of dependency exists with respect to 
surviving siblings. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
VERNA CAPOROZ and ROXSANNE CLASTIMODO 
(BARNEY CAPOROZ, deceased) 
PAGE 4 
killed, the applicants would have continued to receive some 
assistance, and that it was reasonable necessary for the deceased 
worker to render aid to the applicants to allow them to maintain 
their accustomed standard of living. Farnsworth v. Industrial 
Commission/ 534 P.2d 897, 899 (1975), citing Rigby v. Industrial 
Commission. 75 Utah 454, 286 P. 628 (1930). 
Applying the foregoing test to the facts of this case, the 
Industrial Commission concludes Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo have 
not established they were dependent upon Mr. Caporoz within the 
meaning of §35-1-68 of the Act. While Mr. Caporoz carried his 
share of household expenses, he did not subsidize his sisters' 
expenses. To the contrary, it appears that Mr. Caporoz and his 
sisters had developed a system of sharing common expenses, but that 
each of them paid their own personal expenses. While Mr. Caporoz 
may have occasionally treated his sisters to movies, admission to 
Lagoon or lodging and meals at Wendover, the Industrial Commission 
does not consider such items as significant to the support and 
maintenance of Ms. Caporoz or Ms. Clastimodo. 
The Industrial Commission also concludes that Mr. Caporoz' 
financial participation was not necessary for Ms. Caporoz and Ms. 
Clastimodo to maintain their standard of living. It*appears that 
the financial difficult suffered by Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo 
after their brother's injury resulted from the fact that Ms. 
Caporoz stopped working, rather than the loss of support from Mr. 
Caporoz. 
In light of the foregoing, the Industrial Commission affirms 
the determination of the ALJ that Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo 
were not dependent upon Mr. Caporoz and are not entitled to 
dependents' benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
II. TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION: 
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo ask the Industrial Commission 
to order payment of temporary total disability compensation to Mr. 
Caporoz' estate for the period between Mr. Caporoz' accident and 
his death. The Industrial Commission is unaware that any claim for 
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temporary total disability compensation was filed prior to Mr. 
Caporoz' death. It is clear than no award of such compensation was 
made prior to his death. Under such circumstances, the decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Pacific States Cast Tron Pipe Co. v. 
Industrial Commission. 218 P.2d 970, 974 (1950), is controlling: 
The right to compensation for injuries is a right 
personal to the employee and unless payments have accrued 
or a determination has been made by the Commission there 
is no right to which the personal representative or a 
dependent can succeed. 
Because no temporary total disability compensation accrued to 
Mr. Caporoz before his death, any claim he might have had to such 
compensation expired with his death. Therefore, the ALJ correctly 
declined to order payment of temporary total disability 
compensation to Mr. Caporoz' estate. 
III. ALJ'S CONSIDERATION OF DISPUTES OF FACT AND LAW: 
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo contend that the ALJ improperly 
deferred to the analysis and arguments of the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund, thereby failing to weigh and resolve factual and legal issues 
according to his own judgment. 
The Industrial Commission finds no merit to this argument. It 
is the written decision, signed and issued by the ALJ, which must 
be taken as the ALJ's final judgment in this case. Even if the 
contents of a decision have been suggested by the evidence and 
arguments of a party, the ALJ manifested his own judgment by 
signing the decision. Of course, the decision must properly apply 
the law and be supported by the evidence. Any party believing the 
decision to be deficient may obtain review by the Industrial 
Commission, which has authority to modify the ALJ's findings of 
fact and application of law. In this case, the Industrial 
Commission has reviewed the testimony, documentary record and 
arguments of the parties. Based on that review, the Industrial 
Commission agrees with the ALJ's determination. 
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ORDER 
The Industrial Commission affirms the ALJ's decision and 
denies Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo's motion for review. It is 
so ordered. 
Dated t h i s2g%. ay of October, 1996 
fe 3 illertson 
Chairm 
,-MIUJktiiO^ 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
**CJ£T<1 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
C^^^L. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by 
the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such 
petition for review must be received by the court within 3 0 days of 
the date of this order. 
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§ 35-1-71, U.C.A. 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-71 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C J & — 9 9 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation 
( 296. 
35-1-71. Dependents — Presumption. 
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for support 
upon a deceased employee: 
(1) Children under the age of 18 years, or over if physically or mentally 
incapacitated and dependent upon the parent, with whom they are living 
at the time of the death of such parent, or who is legally bound for their 
support. 
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under Subsection 35-1-
68(2XaXi), a surviving husband or wife shall be presumed to be wholly 
dependent upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the time of the 
employee's death. 
, In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be 
determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the 
time of the iqjury or death of such employee, except for purposes of dependency 
reviews under Subsection 35-l-68(2XaXiii). No person shall be considered as a 
dependent unless he or she is a member of the family of the deceased employee, 
or bears the relation of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother 
or sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall include a posthumous child, 
and a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half sisters 
shall be included in the words "brother or sister19 as above used. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, ft 79, subsec 4; 
CX. 1917, ft 3140, subsec 5; L. 1921, ch. 67, 
i ljRJSL 1983,42-1-67; L. 1939, ch. 61, ( 1;C. 
1943,42-1-67; L. 1977, ch. 151, f 5; 1979, ch. 
183, t 4; 1987, ch. 126, § 3. 
Compiler's Notes.—The references to Sub-
sections 35-l-68(2XaXi) and (2XaXiii) should 
now be to Subsections (SXaXi) and (GXaXiii) of 
that section, following a 1994 amendment add-
ing and redesignating subsections in § 35-lr68. 
Cross-References. — Right of action by 
husband for injuries to wife, { 80-2-4. 
Right of action by parent for injury to child, 
{ 78-11-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Ability to work. 
Children. 
Effect of majority after award. 
Findings of commission. 
General construction. 
Irrebuttable presumption. 
Necessity for marriage relationship. 
Other relatives. 
Parents. 
Posthumous child. 
Presumption and burden of proof 
Question of dependency. 
Res adjudicata. 
Siblings. 
Spouses. 
Stepchildren. 
*est for determining dependency. 
Unmarried companion. 
Validity of marriage. 
Weight and sufficiency of evidence. 
Words and phrases defined. 
Constitutionality. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is not violated by treating 
nonresident aliens differently than resident 
aliens and Canadians. Martinez v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416 (Utah 1986). 
Since the constitutionality of worker's com-
pensation death benefits must be viewed in 
light of the laws and history of this country, the 
extension of full death benefits to foreign na-
tionals is not constitutionally required. 
Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416 
(Utah 1986). 
Since this section does not conflict with a 
treaty to which the United States and Mexico 
225 
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R586-1-12,U.A.C. 
R568-1-12. Interest. 
A. Interest must be paid on each benefit payment which comprises the award from the 
date that payment would have been due and payable at the rate of 8% per annum. 
B. For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits shall become "due and payable" (as 
used in Section 35-1-78, U.C.A.,) as follows: 
1. Temporary total compensation shall be due and payable within 21 days of the date 
of the accident. 
2. Permanent partial compensation shall be due and payable on the next day following 
the termination of a temporary total disability. However, where the condition is not fixed for 
rating purposes, the interest shall commence from the date the permanent partial impairment can 
be medically determined. 
3. Permanent partial or permanent total disability compensation payable by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be due and payable as 
soon as reasonably practical after an order is issued. 
